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Sharon Street’s evolutionary debunking argument—her Darwinian Dilemma—is meant to
challenge value realists to reconcile the evaluative attitudes we tend to hold, shaped as they are
by evolution, with the attitude-independent evaluative facts that realists posit. Ramon Das argues
that Street’s argument relies on illicit metaphysical assumptions about evaluative facts, and that
these assumptions beg the question against a particular form of value realism called naturalist
realism. I argue that Street makes no such metaphysical assumptions, and that her argument
requires no particular metaphysical construal of evaluative facts to work. I further argue that any
objection of the kind Das raises—those that turn on the metaphysical underpinnings of
evaluative facts—is unlikely to succeed against Street’s Darwinian Dilemma.
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1

INTRODUCTION

Like anyone else, I am variably pleased by, indifferent to, annoyed by, disappointed in, or
just plain horrified by the behavior of other people. I wonder how they could be looking at the
same world I am—sometimes from what seems to be a similar viewpoint—and yet respond so
differently. I wonder, too, how one might encourage, convince, or even force some of those
people to change their behavior. I take such concerns to be at the heart of the metaethical debate
about whether some form of evaluative realism—the thesis that there are objective, attitudeindependent evaluative facts—is true.
That different persons have at least somewhat different sets of values seems obvious, as does
the fact that those differing values, along with differing circumstances and understandings of the
world, lead those persons to engage in a wide variety of behaviors. Yet I doubt the usefulness of
believing that my values and my behaviors are right or good (in any objective sense), and that at
least some other values and behaviors are wrong or bad. Employing evaluative realism to explain
human behavior seems to me to be distracting and misleading. If I believe that some corrupt
politician is simply a bad person, I may be discouraged from looking for the full psychological,
social, and political causes of her behavior, and thus my understanding of her behavior may
suffer. If I want to change this politician’s behavior, or reduce such corrupt behavior overall, I
again doubt that the employment of value realism will be effective. Chances are that the
politician either already believes her behavior to be wrong (but somehow justified), or is at least
aware that the majority of other people believe it to be so. Realists will balk at this caricature,
and rightly so; I use it to describe only briefly what I believe is at stake in the debate about
evaluative realism, and explain part of why I defend evaluative antirealism.
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On its own, evaluative realism is something of a toothless claim. The thesis isn’t worth much
unless realists explain how we can know what the evaluative facts are, or at least how we would
know we are making progress toward the evaluative facts. Evolutionary debunking arguments
(EDAs)—Sharon Street’s Darwinian Dilemma, for example—point to evidence that natural
selection has had a significant effect on our evaluative psychology, challenging realists to
explain the congruence between the evaluative facts that realists tend to defend and the
evaluative attitudes that would have increased our ancestors’ reproductive success. The key idea
is that if evolutionary forces best explain the evaluative attitudes people hold (including any
observed convergence among those attitudes), then the realists’ purported evaluative facts seem
superfluous. Parsimony, Street’s argument goes, suggests evaluative antirealism (Street, 2006,
129).1
Resistance to EDAs by evaluative realists has been significant, but inconclusive. Some argue
that we don’t know enough about the processes by which evolution has shaped our psychology
to draw conclusions about the (non)existence of objective evaluative facts (Shafer-Landau,
2012). Others attempt to incorporate evolutionary influences into their explanations of objective
evaluative facts (Enoch, 2010). In this essay, however, I turn to what is meant to be a new
critique of EDAs, due to Ramon Das (2016). He examines four EDAs, objecting that each relies
on implicit metaphysical assumptions about the nature of evaluative facts—assumptions which
illicitly cut off realist options for explaining how we can know those evaluative facts. For the
purposes of his project, Das adopts a form of naturalist realism—the position that there are
objective evaluative facts, and that they supervene on natural facts—for it is this form of

1

Evaluative antirealism has implications that many find disagreeable, including providing a foundation for an
evaluative subjectivism that threatens to undermine at least one of the bases for moral responsibility. I do not take
such implications to tell against the accuracy of the position.
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evaluative realism that he thinks is given short shrift by EDAs. Das concludes that the
argumentative force of the EDAs he examines is due largely to these illicit metaphysical
assumptions, and not to any epistemological worries raised by an evolutionary explanation of our
evaluative attitudes. In this essay I will focus on one of Das’s targeted EDAs—Sharon Street’s
Darwinian Dilemma (2006)—arguing that once her full argument is brought to bear on the
naturalist realist position, it is clear that no particular metaphysical construal of evaluative facts
is required for her EDA to work, and that Das’s objection can thus be dismissed. I will then
argue that Das’s failure suggests that any objection to Street that turns on the metaphysical
underpinnings of evaluative facts is unlikely to succeed. My conclusion is that Street’s EDA is
successful at putting pressure on all forms of evaluative realism, including naturalist realism,
leaving these positions just that much more difficult to defend.

2

STREET’S DARWINIAN DILEMMA AND
THE NATURALIST REALIST RESPONSE

Natural selection can explain why we hold (at least some of) the evaluative attitudes we do:
they influence our behavior in ways that are likely to have promoted our reproductive success.2
We tend to protect rather than neglect our young, we tend to repay kindness with kindness, and
we tend to seek punishment against those who cheat us. Those who didn’t share these evaluative
attitudes, our best scientific explanation goes, were less likely to have descendants, and that is
why we observe a cross-cultural convergence toward such attitudes today. Street observes that
“we can expect there to have been overwhelming [selective] pressure in the direction of making

Street and Das both use the terms ‘evaluative attitudes,’ ‘evaluative judgments,’ and ‘evaluative beliefs’
synonymously. Nothing in either Street’s or Das’s essay turns on which term is used, and the same is true for my
essay. I will refer consistently to evaluative attitudes. Likewise, both Street and Das use the terms ‘evaluative truths’
and ‘evaluative facts’ synonymously. I will refer consistently to evaluative facts.
2
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those evaluative judgements which tended to promote reproductive success (such as the
judgement that one’s life is valuable), and against making those evaluative judgements which
tended to decrease reproductive success (such as the judgement that one should attack one’s
offspring)” (2006, 114-5). Notably absent in this evolutionary account of our most commonly
held evaluative attitudes is reference to the realist’s attitude-independent evaluative facts. It is
not, on Street’s account, valuable to care for one’s offspring unless one actually finds it
appealing—that is, if one holds the appropriate evaluative attitudes. If I were to value neglecting
my offspring instead, then that is what would be valuable to me—I cannot be objectively wrong
about caring for or neglecting my offspring.3 This is the basic metaethical constructivist
position.4
Street argues that realist theories of value—which she defines as those whose central claim is
that “there are at least some evaluative facts or truths that hold independently of all our
evaluative attitudes” (Street 2006, 110)—are incompatible with an evolutionary account of value
of the kind I sketched above.5 The evaluative realist, according to Street’s “Darwinian
Dilemma,” must say either that: (1) evolution has not steered us toward the evaluative facts; or
that (2) evolution has steered us toward the evaluative facts. On (1), evolution is insensitive to
the evaluative facts, so if we accept that evolution has had a strong influence on our evaluative

3

Though I may be wrong in relation to one of my more deeply held values. For example, if my most deeply held
value is the survival of my offspring and I happen to believe that neglecting my offspring will improve their chances
of survival, then I might come to value neglecting my offspring. One might say that I am mistaken in my belief that
neglecting my offspring will improve their chances of survival. If that is true, then I could be said to be wrong in my
valuing neglecting my offspring, but only in relation to my more deeply held value of the survival of my offspring.
4
See Street’s “What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics?” (2010).
5
It is vital not to confound Street’s phrase “independently of all our evaluative attitudes” with the common
shorthand “mind-independent.” Naturalist realists, for example, hold that evaluative truths are not mindindependent, and yet that they are still objective—they depend in no way on our evaluative attitudes. Such theories
are targeted by Street’s EDA just as much as theories that posit mind-independent evaluative truths.
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attitudes, then there is no reason to think the attitudes we tend to hold correspond to the
evaluative facts:
On this view, allowing our evaluative judgements to be shaped by evolutionary influences is analogous
to setting out for Bermuda and letting the course of your boat be determined by the wind and tides: just
as the push of the wind and tides on your boat has nothing to do with where you want to go, so the
historical push of natural selection on the content of our evaluative judgements has nothing to do with
evaluative truth. (Street, 2006, 121)

Realists tend not to argue for the existence of evaluative facts that are completely aside from our
held evaluative attitudes. Therefore, if a realist chooses (1), they will need to explain what guides
us toward the evaluative facts. Here the realist might suggest that our capacity for rational
reflection could overcome evolutionary influence and guide us toward the evaluative facts. Over
time, the story goes, we cull the evaluative attitudes our reason tells us are false, and replace
them with attitudes that are hopefully a little closer to the evaluative facts. Yet, as Street points
out, rational reflection “must always proceed from some evaluative standpoint; it must work
from some evaluative premises; it must treat some evaluative judgements as fixed, if only for the
time being, as the assessment of other evaluative judgements is undertaken” (Street, 2006, 124).
Since whatever evaluative attitudes one chooses as fixed must themselves have been influenced
by evolution, using them to guide one’s rational reflection will only yield results that are also
influenced by evolution. Enoch, for example, posits “survival is good” as a fixed evaluative
attitude that one may use, along with rational reflection, to determine other (objectively true, let
us not forget) evaluative attitudes (2010, 430). Street’s point is that one cannot start with an
evaluative attitude so obviously influenced by evolution as “survival is good” and then say that
the other evaluative attitudes one generates are not themselves influenced by evolution. If this
picture is right, then rational reflection, Street argues, cannot guide our evaluative attitudes away
from evolutionary influence and toward the evaluative facts (Street, 2006, 124).
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If the realist accepts (2)—that evolution has steered us toward the evaluative facts—she must
explain why those among our ancestors whose evaluative attitudes tracked the evaluative facts
would have greater reproductive success than those whose attitudes did not track the evaluative
facts. Street grants, provisionally, the realist’s main claim: that there are evaluative facts that
hold independently of our evaluative attitudes. The challenge the Darwinian Dilemma poses is
thus not meant to be metaphysical, but epistemological: it is meant to put pressure on the realist
to explain how we could know which of our evaluative attitudes match the evaluative facts, or
even whether we are moving closer to the evaluative facts.
This challenge, of course, is nothing new for the evaluative realist. What EDAs such as
Street’s bring to the table is that they narrow the conceptual space within which the realist must
work. The likely implausibility of such explanations, on Street’s view, comes from the fact that
the realist must argue that our ancestors had greater reproductive success because their
evaluative attitudes tracked the evaluative facts, and not because those attitudes materially
helped them survive and reproduce. Here is why. Street’s position is that the reason we see today
the commonly-held evaluative attitudes that we do is that those are the attitudes that improved
our reproductive success—those who held different evaluative attitudes would have tended not to
successfully reproduce. If the realist says, for example, that holding certain attitudes increased
our reproductive success, and also those attitudes happen to correspond with the evaluative
facts, then it would seem that is essentially Street’s position with the amendment that there are
evaluative facts, and that particular evaluative attitudes correspond with those facts. If Street’s
evolutionary account can explain the evaluative attitudes we tend to have, without reference to
any evaluative facts (and thus without requiring any explanation of how we might come to know
those evaluative facts), then it would seem the realist’s account is at a disadvantage in terms of
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parsimony, for evaluative facts do not seem to be playing an integral explanatory role. It is worth
noting that even an unchallenged EDA would not disprove evaluative realism (perhaps nothing
can)—Street’s conceit is only that antirealist theories of value do not struggle with the Darwinian
Dilemma in the way that realist theories do. Without a satisfactory explanation of how we can
know the evaluative facts, the realist position loses what would seem to be an important
advantage over competing metaethical positions: the potential to resolve moral disputes by
providing a way to know which of competing evaluative attitudes is correct.
Realist responses to the Darwinian Dilemma are of two main types: attempts to delegitimize
the challenge Street poses and attempts to answer that challenge. An example of the first type is
the claim that for EDAs to operate as advertised, all our evaluative attitudes must be shown to be
adaptive, since the prevalence of attitudes that appear to be non-adaptive might be best explained
by reference to evaluative facts (Shafer-Landau 2012). For example, let’s say I donate to charity
because I value anonymously helping faraway strangers. This behavior and its associated
evaluative attitudes are not obviously adaptive. It is possible, the argument goes, that I adopted
those evaluative attitudes—and thus broke away from evolutionary influence—because of my
ability to track some evaluative truth (perhaps that it is good to help others, and especially so
when I have the means to do so easily). Another attempt to delegitimize EDAs is the argument
that if EDAs debunk our knowledge of response-independent evaluative facts, they may also
debunk philosophical, mathematical, and even perceptual knowledge (Enoch, 2010; ShaferLandau, 2012; Das, 2016).6 While such concerns must be addressed by evolutionary debunkers, I
mention them here mainly to provide context. Of more direct relevance to this essay are realists’

6

If realists pursue this tack in earnest, they may find their antirealist opponents all too willing to abandon the
objective truth of even perceptual knowledge. Street flirts with this conclusion in her 2009 essay, “Evolution and the
normativity of epistemic reasons.”
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attempts to answer the challenge of the Darwinian Dilemma directly—and in particular, the
naturalist realists’ prospects for doing so. I will ultimately argue that Das’s objection to Street
does not improve them.

3

DAS’S DEFINITION OF NATURALIST REALISM

Das claims that Street’s Darwinian Dilemma contains question-begging metaphysical
assumptions about the nature of evaluative facts. He further argues that Street relies on these
assumptions to defeat naturalist realism by declaring the position not to be genuinely realist. I
will argue that Das misunderstands Street’s EDA and consequently underestimates its force
against the naturalist realist position. To get there, I’ll first need to explain the naturalist realist
position as Das sees it, explain why Street thinks the naturalist realist position cannot answer her
EDA, and then explain why Das thinks Street is wrong. In order to avoid begging the question
against the naturalist realist (which is the basis of Das’s objection to Street), it is important that I
describe the position as accurately as I can. It is my hope that this exercise will yield a definition
of the naturalist realist position in its strongest form. If I can show that Street’s EDA answers this
version of naturalist realism, then her EDA can be taken to answer any version of evaluative
realism that shares its features.7
Das (2016) discusses several different versions of what he calls “moral naturalism,” but we
are concerned with the version that he claims Street does not treat fairly. Das says that he intends
to argue that Street “effectively denies that evaluative facts, realistically construed, could
nomologically supervene on natural facts” (Das, 431). The position that Das claims Street denies

Das’s complaint is that Street’s illicit metaphysical assumptions have excluded naturalist realism as a contender to
defeat her EDA. My main claim is that Das is wrong, and that Street does give naturalist realism a chance. While I
explain in sections 7 and 8 why Street thinks Das’s naturalist realism fails against her Darwinian Dilemma, it is not
the aim of this essay to fully defend that part of her argument.
7
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is genuinely realist is the position that Das adopts. On this version of naturalist realism, the main
claims are that attitude-independent evaluative facts exist, and that they nomologically supervene
on natural facts. What does it mean for an evaluative fact to be attitude-independent? First, we
mustn’t take attitude-independence to mean that evaluative facts exist independently of the
existence of creatures capable of evaluating the scenarios to which the evaluative facts pertain.
That is, naturalist realists aren’t committed to the claim that evaluative facts would exist without
humans. Instead, attitude-independence means that the evaluative facts exist regardless of any
particular person’s attitudes. The evaluative facts are, in this sense, objective, and thus one can
be right or wrong about them.
These evaluative facts, according to the naturalist realist, supervene on natural facts.
Supervenience is itself the subject of some debate, but we can mostly set this aside by focusing
only on the features of supervenience relevant to the naturalist realist position. Street describes
the naturalist realist position as one that “holds that evaluative facts are identical with or
constituted by (certain) natural facts” (2006, 112). Street does not use the word “supervenient,”
but I take her phrasing here to stand in its place. Das seems to do the same. While he takes issue
with her construal of the precise metaphysical nature of the identity of evaluative facts and
natural facts (or the constitution of the former by the latter), Das does not argue with the
depiction I’ve just quoted, nor does he call attention to the fact that Street does not specifically
use the word “supervenient.” Das adds, however, citing Jackson (1998), that supervenience may
be understood as the idea that “there can be no change in the supervenient moral facts without a
change in the subvenient natural facts” (Das, 431). I will return to this construal of supervenience
below, as it is central to why Das thinks Street doesn’t give naturalist realism a fair shake.
Finally, because he is interested in the force of Street’s argument against Cornell realists (of
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which Sturgeon is one), Das adds two features to the naturalist realist position from Sturgeon
(1985): “(1) that the exact nature of the identity between moral facts and natural facts remains
largely unknown; and (2) that in trying to determine this identity, we have no alternative but to
make use of our ‘best moral theory, together with our best theory of the rest of the world’” (Das,
431). Street is aware of these features herself, as she cites them elsewhere in (2006, 139), though
Das seems to think that Street has misunderstood or overlooked them.
Having considered the relevant features of supervenience, let’s consider the role of natural
facts in this discussion. We already know that naturalist realists believe that some natural facts,
but not others, are subvenient to the evaluative facts. We also know that Das acknowledges that
the only way to determine which natural facts are subvenient to the evaluative facts is to use our
“best moral theory.” Since agreement on which moral theory is best may be difficult to come by,
naturalist realists in the meantime might do well to consider sketching out at least one further
detail of their position: the group of natural facts which are candidates for subvenience under the
evaluative facts. Specifically, we may wonder whether the candidate natural facts include facts
about human psychology generally, psychological facts about particular humans, both, or
neither. My counterarguments against Das do not turn on this question, yet I find it curious that
he does not give a careful answer.8 Sturgeon comes closer than Das, referring to our “best theory
of the rest of the world”—which must include human psychology—and suggesting that the study
of human psychology as it relates to various moral theories might yield the identities of natural
facts that correspond to the evaluative facts (Sturgeon, 212). However, Sturgeon is silent, as far
as I can determine, on whether specific human psychologies—and their specific evaluative
attitudes—might play some (non-causal) role in the naturalist realist story. Das, as mentioned,

8

Perhaps Das is trying to remain as inclusive as he can of different versions of naturalist realism.
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quotes Sturgeon, and so we might imagine that Das shares Sturgeon’s views on this matter.
However, Das also argues, we’ll see shortly, that “our having the evaluative attitudes we do
depends on the evaluative facts, which in turn depend upon (or are identical with) the natural
facts” (Das, 432). This suggests that for Das, our evaluative attitudes (and the psychologies in
which those attitudes are contained) are not candidates for the natural facts on which the
evaluative facts are supervenient (since the natural facts come earlier in Das’s explanatory chain
than our evaluative attitudes).9 This position, if I’m getting Das right, is surprising considering
that, in attempting to answer the Darwinian Dilemma, Das is trying to show that naturalist
realism fits well with what science can tell us about evolution. On the other hand, if the
evaluative facts are meant to be attitude-independent, perhaps the subvenient natural facts must
also be attitude-independent—that is, they could not be facts about the contents of our specific
attitudes. The upshot is that since Das doesn’t discuss whether the candidate natural facts include
facts about human psychology, we may safely set aside such considerations in our examination
of his position.
The important features of the naturalist realist position, per Das, are:
1. Attitude-independent evaluative facts exist (i.e., evaluative realism is true).
2. The evaluative facts supervene upon—are identical to or are constituted by—(certain) natural
facts. There can thus be no change in the evaluative facts without a corresponding change in
the natural facts (i.e., naturalism is true).
3. The nature of the supervenience relation between the evaluative facts and the natural facts is
(at least for now) unknown.

9

I suppose Das could argue that natural facts about the general nature of our evaluative attitudes are among the
natural facts that play a role in determining the evaluative facts, and that the content of our evaluative attitudes is
then determined by those evaluative facts. If he has this in mind, he does not discuss it.
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4. Our best (and perhaps only) tools for determining the nature of this supervenience relation are
our “best moral theory” and our “best theory of the rest of the world.”
With a clearer definition of the naturalist realist position in hand, I will now explain why Street
thinks the position cannot answer her Darwinian Dilemma.

4

STREET’S ARGUMENT AGAINST NATURALIST REALISM
(PART ONE OF TWO)

Recall that Street’s Darwinian Dilemma (2006) offers the realist two unsavory options:
Either (1) evolution has not steered us toward the evaluative facts, and thus our evaluative
attitudes, having been affected by evolution, are unlikely to track the evaluative facts; or (2)
evolution has steered us toward the evaluative facts, in which case the realist must explain why
those persons whose evaluative attitudes tracked the evaluative facts would have had greater
reproductive success (due to their fact-tracking) than those whose attitudes did not track the
evaluative facts. Of the theories of value that are commonly called realist, the two horns of
Street’s dilemma target many of them, but not all. Street takes special care to explain how at
least one construal of the naturalist realist (she calls it value naturalist) position fares against her
EDA:
Suppose the value naturalist takes the following view. Given that we have the evaluative attitudes we
do, evaluative facts are identical with natural facts N. But if we had possessed a completely different
set of evaluative attitudes, the evaluative facts would have been identical with the very different natural
facts M. Such a view does not count as genuinely realist in my taxonomy, for such a view makes it
dependent on our evaluative attitudes which natural facts evaluative facts are identical with. (Street,
2006, 136)10

10

Note that if we count our evaluative attitudes, dependent as they are on our psychology, as candidates for the
natural facts upon which the evaluative facts depend, then this construal of naturalist realism is consistent with the
formulation that there can be no change in the evaluative facts without a change in the natural facts. However, on
this construal, the naturalist realist position is similar in many respects to Street’s brand of metaethical
constructivism, and in any case, does not count as realist on Street’s definition.
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Street supplies this version of naturalist realism in order to demonstrate that it is not genuinely
realist on her definition: “genuinely realist versions of value naturalism hold that which natural
facts evaluative facts are identical with is independent of all our evaluative attitudes” (Street,
2006, 139). The version of naturalist realism just described is thus not a target of the two horns
of her dilemma. Street goes on to say, “Genuinely realist versions of value naturalism are
vulnerable to the Darwinian Dilemma” (Street, 2006, 139). In what follows, it may be helpful to
think of Street’s dilemma as a trilemma: The evaluative realist must answer one horn of the
dilemma or the other or their position isn’t realist on Street’s definition. There may of course be
metaethical positions that some philosophers call realist that nonetheless do not qualify as such
on Street’s definition. Those philosophers may take Street to task for her definition of realism if
they like, but it is important to note that this is not Das’s aim. He does not dispute Street’s
definition of realism, but, as we will soon see, her construal of naturalist realism.

5

DAS CRIES FOUL

Street’s construal of one version of naturalist realism above (that she thinks is not genuinely
realist) describes the evaluative fact–natural fact supervenience relation as varying with our
evaluative attitudes. Yet in our compiled list of what Das considers to be important features of
the naturalist realist position, there is no mention of evaluative attitudes causally determining the
identities of evaluative facts with natural facts. In fact, according to feature 3, “The nature of the
supervenience relation between the evaluative facts and the natural facts is (at least for now)
unknown.” Das makes much of Street’s construal of the naturalist realist position and how it
differs from his (and Sturgeon’s): “Street makes use…of a familiar realist criterion—mind (or
attitude) independence—but in an illegitimate way that effectively denies the possibility that the
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evaluative could nomologically supervene upon the natural or non-evaluative” (Das, 432).
Street’s construal of naturalist realism above has the evaluative fact–natural fact supervenience
relations depend directly upon our evaluative attitudes. That is, if we were to have different
attitudes, then different natural facts would be the subvenient basis for the evaluative facts, and
these different evaluative fact–natural fact supervenience relations would result in different
evaluative facts. For example, if I held the evaluative attitude that some particular shade of blue
is the noblest color, then my holding that attitude would determine which natural facts were the
subvenient basis for the evaluative facts (perhaps facts about certain wavelengths of light and my
emotional reaction to those wavelengths), and thus what the evaluative facts would be. Yet if I
held a different evaluative attitude—such that some shade of red is the noblest color—then a
different set of natural facts would be the subvenient basis for the evaluative facts. Das wants to
tell a different story (one he takes to be genuinely realist): “Roughly, our having the evaluative
attitudes we do depends on the evaluative facts, which in turn depend upon (or are identical with)
the natural facts” (Das, 432). By assuming that the evaluative fact–natural fact supervenience
relations depend on our evaluative attitudes, Das continues, Street “ignores the possibility that
the direction of metaphysical dependence runs in the opposite direction: from our evaluative
attitudes, via the evaluative facts, onto the natural facts” (Das, 432). Das’s wording here strikes
me as counterintuitive: he simply means to say that Street ignores the possibility that our
evaluative attitudes are metaphysically dependent upon the evaluative fact–natural fact
supervenience relations. Das goes on to observe that since Street’s position
…apparently involves denying that robustly realist evaluative facts could nomologically supervene on
natural facts, it seems reasonable to suppose that she is tacitly making a very strong metaphysical
assumption about the nature of the evaluative, hence the nature of the moral. Specifically, she seems to
be tacitly assuming that on any robustly realist account of evaluative facts, such facts would have to be
utterly different from or non-continuous with natural facts. (Das, 432)

15
If Das’s reading of Street is right, then he seems to have demonstrated that her EDA does
rely on an illicit metaphysical assumption in order to deal with at least one evaluative realist
account: the naturalist realist position as Das describes it. Having framed Street’s EDA as a
trilemma, we can put Das’s complaint more precisely: Street relies on an illicit metaphysical
assumption to send one kind of naturalist realism—a strong contender, on Das’s view, to escape
both of the first two horns of her trilemma—to the third horn by branding the view as not
genuinely realist. If Das’s naturalist realist is genuinely realist, then it deserves its chance to
defeat the Darwinian Dilemma. The problem for Das is that he misunderstands Street’s view. As
I’ll explain in the next section, not only does Street not rely on any illicit metaphysical
assumptions to handle Das’s naturalist realism, she explicitly deals with a position much like the
one he describes.

6

STREET’S ARGUMENT AGAINST NATURALIST REALISM
(PART TWO OF TWO)

Street (2006) devotes a lengthy section to answering the naturalist realist (though again, she
calls the position value naturalist). Her approach is first to distinguish between the versions of
naturalist realism that are genuinely realist, and those that, according to her criteria, are not. One
of those criteria, as I mentioned previously, is that the evaluative fact–natural fact identities,
whatever they may be, must hold independently of our attitudes. Street then presents a version of
naturalist realism wherein the evaluative fact–natural fact identities are determined by our
attitudes (that is, if we were to have different evaluative attitudes, then the evaluative fact–
natural fact identities would be different). Street presents this version of naturalist realism (as I
mentioned) in order to demonstrate that it is not genuinely realist according to her criteria.
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However, Street does not suggest that this analysis applies to naturalist realism as a whole—that
is, Street does not assume that no version of naturalist realism is genuinely realist. In fact, she
explicitly allows for a genuinely realist version of naturalist realism, and describes the fate of any
such position: it faces one of the first two horns of (what I’ve called) Street’s trilemma. Das
appears either not to have read the relevant parts of Street’s arguments, or not to have fully
understood them. Street describes her criteria for a naturalist realist position that would be
genuinely realist:
…in order to count as realist, a version of value naturalism must take the view that facts about naturalnormative identities (in other words, facts about exactly which natural facts evaluative facts are
identical with) are independent of our evaluative attitudes. On the kind of view I have in mind,
evaluative facts are identical with natural facts N, and even if our evaluative attitudes had been entirely
different, perhaps not tracking those evaluative/natural facts N at all, but instead tracking some very
different natural facts M, the evaluative facts still would have been identical with natural facts N, and
not natural facts M. (Street, 2006, 137)

Street does not deny “the possibility that the evaluative could nomologically supervene upon the
natural or non-evaluative” (Das, 432); nor does she assume that “on any robustly realist account
of evaluative facts, such facts would have to be utterly different from or non-continuous with
natural facts” (Das, 432). If we return to the four important features of the naturalist realist
position according to Das, we see that Street’s criteria comfortably accommodate the position he
describes. Her criteria include (and furthermore demand) attitude-independent evaluative facts,
thus accommodating feature 1. Those evaluative facts are “identical with” (shorthand for
“identical with or constituted by”) some natural facts, thus accommodating feature 2. Finally,
Street’s criteria do not demand that the realist describe the nature of the supervenience relation
between the evaluative facts and the natural facts (other than that the relation must allow for
attitude-independent evaluative facts), nor that the realist describe the tools by which he might
begin to determine this relation, so features 3 and 4 are also allowed. Das should thus be satisfied
that his version of naturalist realism is acknowledged by Street, and that she properly describes
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the position as realist. Does any of this suggest that Das’s naturalist realism succeeds (or fails)
against Street’s Darwinian Dilemma? No—it only shows that Street’s EDA does in fact account
for the position Das describes. However, recall that Das’s objection to Street is that she
“effectively denies the possibility that the evaluative could nomologically supervene upon the
natural or non-evaluative” (Das, 432). I hope I have made it clear that Street does no such thing.
It should also be clear that her EDA does not rely on illicit metaphysical assumptions about the
nature of evaluative facts (at least no assumptions of the kind Das describes). I conclude that
once Street’s full position on naturalist realism is taken into account, Das’s objection can be
dismissed.

7

HOW DOES DAS’S NATURALIST REALISM FARE AGAINST
THE DARWINIAN DILEMMA?

Now that we understand that Das’s naturalist realism is accommodated by Street’s EDA, we
can determine how the position fares. Recall the position’s features: attitude-independent
evaluative facts exist, and they have some supervenience relation to (certain) natural facts. There
can be no change in the evaluative facts without a corresponding change in the natural facts, and
while the nature of the evaluative fact–natural fact supervenience relation is (for now) unknown,
we may use our “best moral theory” and our “best theory of the rest of the world” to attempt to
determine those identities. Das is convinced that Street dispenses with his position by calling it
antirealist (an assessment which I’ve just argued is incorrect), and thus he does not consider how
his naturalist realism would fare against either of the first two horns of Street’s trilemma. We
may subject his naturalist realism to Street’s EDA on his behalf, but we will need to consider two
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possibilities: The naturalist realist must either use a moral theory to begin filling out some of the
evaluative fact–natural fact identities (thus making the naturalist realist position substantive), or
choose not to.
I will address the second option in the next section. Street addresses the first option:
The genuinely realist value naturalist posits that there are independent facts about natural-normative
identities. But the value naturalist also holds that in trying to figure out what those identities are, we
will have to rely very heavily on our existing evaluative judgements. Yet, as we have seen, those
evaluative judgements have been tremendously influenced by Darwinian selective pressures. And so
the question arises: what is the relation between evolutionary influences on our evaluative judgements,
on the one hand, and the independent truths about natural-normative identities posited by the realist, on
the other? (Street, 2006, 140)

The naturalist realist will have to rely on his evaluative attitudes when attempting to determine
which evaluative fact–natural fact identities are the right ones, even if that amounts to relying on
those attitudes to choose and apply some moral theory to get the job done. At that point, the
attitudes the naturalist realist relies upon would themselves be subject to the first two horns of
Street’s trilemma. That is, attempting to apply a moral theory to determine the evaluative facts
ultimately falters for the same reason that attempting to apply rational reflection falters. A moral
theory chosen according to one’s evaluative attitudes cannot escape evolutionary influence if
those evaluative attitudes are influenced by evolution. Or so Street’s argument goes. The
application of Street’s EDA that I’ve just described is the standard application—that is, once we
work past Das’s complaint that his naturalist realism is treated unfairly, there is nothing special
about his position. It is not my intention to fully defend Street’s EDA—only to show that she
accommodates positions such as Das’s without relying on illicit metaphysical assumptions.
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8

DOES THE NATURALIST REALIST HAVE TO IDENTIFY
THE EVALUATIVE FACTS?

Das might object that he needn’t spell out which natural facts are the subvenient basis for the
evaluative facts—this is the second option in the preceding section.11 Such a position might look
something like a second-order ethical (metaethical) position with a question mark where its firstorder ethical contents would normally be. In plainer language, Das might say that there are some
evaluative facts that have a supervenience relation with some natural facts, and that while he may
have some ideas about which natural facts those are (and what the resulting evaluative facts
might be), he needn’t spell out those ideas as part of a defense of naturalist realism as a
metaethical theory. This is a perfectly reasonable position, and one that is arguably realist on
Street’s definition, for Das would be positing attitude-independent evaluative facts while simply
declining to propose what those facts are.
However, this would not be a substantive ethical theory. If the theory says nothing about
which natural facts are the subvenient basis for the evaluative facts, then it would seem that it
says nothing about what is, in fact, right and wrong. Lacking any specific evaluative facts, it is
not a target of Street’s Darwinian Dilemma—but neither can it be said to have escaped her
Dilemma. Street’s challenge to the realist, remember, is to explain the coincidence of our
evaluative attitudes with the realist’s posited evaluative facts in a way that accounts for the
influence of evolutionary forces. She is thus arguing that a scientific theory (evolution) says
something about our first-order ethics (our evaluative attitudes are those that have tended to
promote reproductive success), which in turn suggests something about our metaethics (that at
the very least evaluative antirealism is easier to square with evolution and our first-order ethics

11

Considering that Das has not spelled out which natural facts are subvenient under the evaluative facts, we might
guess that he has such an approach in mind.
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than evaluative realism is). “The challenge for realist theories of value is to explain the relation
between…evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the
independent evaluative truths that realism posits, on the other” (Street, 2006, 109). The realist
cannot accept Street’s challenge unless he identifies at least some of those independent
evaluative truths. Whenever Das (or whomever) is ready to do so—that is, the moment any firstorder ethical contents are revealed—it will be subject to Street’s EDA.

9

CONCLUSION: DAS’S FAILURE IS INSTRUCTIVE

Das argues that Street, by making illicit metaphysical assumptions, unfairly deemed
naturalist realist positions such as his not to be genuinely realist. I’ve shown that Street makes no
such metaphysical assumptions, and can in fact account for Das’s brand of naturalist realism.
Das’s failure is instructive, however, because it suggests that any objection to Street’s EDA that
turns on the metaphysical underpinnings of evaluative facts is likely to fail. The reason is that
Street not only (provisionally) grants to her realist opponents that evaluative facts exist, she
allows her opponents to posit any sort of metaphysical basis for those facts that they like. Street
asks for three things from a value realist who wishes to accept the challenge of her Darwinian
Dilemma: (1) The theory of value must be genuinely realist—that is, it must posit attitudeindependent evaluative facts. (2) The theory’s proponent must either deny or assert a relation
between the posited evaluative facts on the one hand, and the evolutionary forces that have
influenced our evaluative attitudes on the other. (3) By combining 1 and 2, the theorist should at
least aim to produce an explanation of our observed evaluative attitudes that is more plausible
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than the evolutionary (constructivist and antirealist) account that Street offers.12 Other than these
three constraints, the field is wide open for naturalist realists and non-naturalist realists alike.
There are numerous potential vulnerabilities in Street’s argument. We may find that
evolution does not function in the way she needs it to for her EDA to succeed. One could argue
that her definition of realism is too restrictive. One might show (as I previously mentioned) that
her EDA debunks some kind of knowledge that is necessary for the EDA to work, and thus show
that the EDA is self-defeating.13 Finally, one might simply decide that a given realist theory of
value more plausibly accounts for our evaluative attitudes than Street’s evolutionary account. I
have merely argued that Street is not vulnerable to the charge that she illicitly forbids viable
challengers to her Darwinian Dilemma by prohibiting any particular metaphysical configuration
of the evaluative facts. Street targets realist theories of value, and in her examples, she focuses
on theories with certain kinds of metaphysical foundations (the kinds that tend to be the bases of
realist theories of value). However, the force of her attack comes not from poking at the
metaphysical foundations of those theories, but from asking the realist to give an explanation of
the evaluative facts—whatever their metaphysical construal—that accounts for the influence
evolution seems to have had on our evaluative attitudes.
I doubt very seriously that any dyed-in-the-wool evaluative realist will be convinced by the
Darwinian Dilemma to let go of his evaluative facts. However, I would not take the number of

“According to metaethical constructivism, there are no facts about what is valuable apart from facts about a
certain point of view on the world and what is entailed from within that point of view. Normative truth, according to
the constructivist, does not outrun what follows from within the evaluative standpoint, but rather consists in
whatever is entailed from within it” (Street, 2010, 371). Such a position sidesteps the Darwinian Dilemma because it
posits no evaluative facts.
13
For example, de Cruz et al. argue that evolutionary accounts “according to which human cognitive capacities are
so deeply biased and defective that knowledge is ruled out are self-undermining. There would be no good reason to
assume that scientific theories are justified, or that philosophical reflection and argumentation (such as an EDA)
provides us with sound conceptual knowledge” (de Cruz et al., 525). Sterpetti (2015) offers resistance to the
argument that EDAs are self-defeating.
12
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openly defecting realists to be the appropriate measure of Street’s success. Her EDA, along with
several underwhelming attempts to disarm or defeat it (Copp, 2008; Enoch, 2010; Das, 2016),
will serve as signposts to those who are coming of age in an increasingly chaotic world in which
the sciences are telling us more about ourselves than we’d perhaps like to know. Evaluative
realism may offer comfortable answers, but I suspect that the intellectual leaders of the coming
generations will not be seeking such comfort. If we really are going to figure out how to live
with one another, the first step may be to let go of the idea that we are right and they are not.
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